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Riegger: Legal Profession

Legal Profession
by William J. Riegger*
Professional Corporations Act

The Professional Corporations Act, l which became effective
November 13, 1968, seemingly caught most members of the
California Bar unaware of its passage. Nevertheless, it will
have an important effect upon attorneys and clients. The
act enables the members of a number of professions, of which
the legal profession is one, to form corporations and thereby
obtain benefits that non-professional corporations now enjoy.
Although it might seem appropriate for a review of the year's
developments in the legal profession to give a painstaking
analysis, a definitive work on this act has already been written.
The article appears in the November-December Journal of the
State Bar of California and is co-authored by three of the
* B.S.L. 1949, J.D. 1950, University
of Minnesota. Professor of Law and
Assistant Dean, University of San Francisco School of Law. Member, Arizona
and Minnesota State Bars.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

The author extends his appreciation
to Roger A. Levy, student at Golden
Gate College, School of Law, for assistance in preparation of this article.
1. Cal. Slats. 1968 Ch. 1375.
CAL LAW 1969
245

1

Legal Profession

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 11

lawyers active in promulgating the act-Paul A. Peterson and
Byron F. White of San Diego, and H. Bradley Jones of Los
Angeles.
Malpractice
In Heyer v. Flaig,2 the supreme court clarified the application of the statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure
section 339 (1), to a complaint filed against an attorney for
alleged malpractice. Plaintiffs brought the action for damages
based on the attorney's negligence in preparing their deceased
mother's will. The complaint was filed more than two years
after preparation of the will but less than two years after the
mother's death.
Rather than interpret section 339 (1) under a contract
theory, that the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, and
thus conclude that the period started to run when the will was
made, the court invoked a tort theory under which the period
would have have started at the time the mother died. The
court applied the tort theory for two basic reasons. First,
the attorney's duty to the testator extended to her death
because of her reliance on the attorney preparing and maintaining a testamentary scheme that would coincide with her
wishes until her death. Second, plaintiffs were unable to
bring an action against the defendant until the testator died,
yet the period could not have commenced to run until a cause
of action accrued; a cause of action cannot accrue until there
is an available remedy.
If the attorney's negligence is the failure to perfect an appeal, may the injured client obtain damages from the attorney
to the extent of the complaint even though unsuccessful in the
trial court? According to Croce v. Sanchez,3 the client may
not, if the appeal could not have led to a reversal as a matter
of law. In Croce it was found that plaintiff, in the original
suit, had not sustained her burden of proof. The appellate
court reviewed the superior court file in both cases and the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/11

2. 70 Cal.2d - , 74 Cal. Rptr. 225,
449 P.2d 161 (1969).
3. 256 Cal. App.2d 680, 64 Cal. Rptr.
246
CAL LAW 1969

448 (1967), cert. den. 391 U.S. 927,
20 L.Ed.2d 666, 88 S.Ct. 1827.

2

Legal

rrOH!lSlSlUlI

Riegger: Legal Profession

reporter's transcript in the first cause and found nothing
requiring a reversal. In effect, does this not give a client
who has lost the right to appeal an appellate review of the
original action?
In Propria Persona

In City of Downey v. Johnson,4 the determinative issue on
appeal became not the extent of an award for the city's condemnation of a deceased's property, but Johnson's capacity
as executor and conservator to appear in propria persona.
The court held that, although Johnson in his representative
capacity could file a notice of appeal, he could not appear in
propria persona at trial or on appeal. Because Johnson did
so appear, the appellate court concluded that the judgment
below, condemning the property and rendering an award, was
void: "( A) person who is not a licensed attorney and who is
acting as an administrator, executor or guardian cannot practice law in matters relating to his trusteeship on the theory
that he is practicing for himself."5
Fee Splitting
During the past year the Court of Appeal, Second District
was called upon to decide an interesting case, Provisor v.
Haas Realty,6 dealing with an attorney's right to an agreed
share of a real estate broker's commission. In rendering its
decision the court set forth some guidelines, quite helpful to
the practitioner in determining when he may judiciously enter
into such an agreement and collect his fee under its terms.
Plaintiff, an attorney, was asked by persons interested in
certain real property to help them negotiate for its purchase.
The sale was offered through the defendant, a real estate
broker. With plaintiff's help in the negotiations, a sale was
4. 263 Cal. App.2d 775, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 830 (1968).
5. 263 Cal. App.2d at 779, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 833, quoted from Arkansas
Bar Assn. v. Union Nat. Bank, 224
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Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); In re
Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W.
318, 73 A.L.R. 1319 (1930).
6. 256 Cal. App.2d 850, 64 Cal. Rptr.
509 (1967).
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consummated. Defendant refused to pay plaintiff his agreed
share of the commission.
Plaintiff's claim rested upon two separate oral agreements,
each confirmed by a memorandum signed by defendant's
agent: the first in time entitled him to half the commission
as a fee; the second entitled him to all the commission over
$5,600. Payment was conditioned upon the making of the
sale. Neither of the memorandums mentioned for whom
plaintiff was working.
At the trial there was contradictory testimony concerning
a conference in which plaintiff, the defendant's agent, and
plaintiff's clients had together conferred over who was obligated to pay plaintiff's fees. Plaintiff testified that he told
defendant's agent that he expected to be paid for services to
be rendered and that he told his clients that he expected to
be paid whether the sale was made or not. One of his clients
testified that it was agreed at the conference that the clients
would be liable only if the sale did not materialize; otherwise
the defendant was to be liable. The agent testified that nothing was said about paying plaintiff for legal services rendered
or about to be rendered to his clients and nothing was said
about their paying a fee if the sale was not consummated. 7
In arriving at a decision against the plaintiff attorney,
the court construed two statutes. The first was California
Business and Professions Code section 10137-"Splitting of a
Broker's Commission." It says in part:
It is unlawful for any licensed real estate broker to employ or compensate, directly or indirectly, any person
for performing any of the acts within the scope of this
chapter who is not a licensed real estate broker, or a
real estate salesman licensed under the broker employing
or compensating him.
The other was a special exemption for attorneys provided
in section 10133 of the same code:
The definitions of a real estate broker and a real estate
7. 256 Cal. App.2d at 854, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 511.
248
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salesman as set forth in sections 10131 and 10132, do not
. ( c) Services rendered by
include the following.
an attorney at law in performing his duties as such attorney at law. (Emphasis added.)
Since the plaintiff had no real estate broker's or salesman's
license, was he rendering services in his capacity as an attorney under section 10133 and therefore legally eligible to
collect a part of the commission? If the facts compel a negative answer, the attorney's work is characterized as that of
a broker, is subject to the requirement of a license, and goes
uncompensated.
To answer this question in Provisor the court relied in part
on decisions of other states having statutes substantially similar
to sections 10137 and 10133. 8 The court observed that these
decisions have narrowed the avenue by which an attorney
who is not licensed as a broker can enter the realm of a real
estate broker or salesman and have further held that this
avenue is available only when a true attorney-client relationship exists.
If the client does not seek to bind himself but seeks rather
to shift the obligation of payment to the broker or seller, he
is not in the true sense a client of the attorney. In this situation
the attorney loses the statutory license exemption of 10133
because his work is tantamount to that of a broker, who is
subject to the fee splitting limitations of section 10137. As
a consequence, if an attorney has no license he may not share
in the broker's commission.
The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was
not the same as in the situation above. The court in Provisor
disposed of the possibility that the plaintiff was actually the
defendant's attorney, by upholding the trial court's findings
that no agreement existed between plaintiff and defendant and
that plaintiff did not render any direct legal services to defendant.
Provisor indicates that short of possessing a broker's or
8. Tobin v. Courshon, 155 So.2d
785, 99 A.L.R.2d 1147 (1963); Krause
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salesman's license, the only means by which plaintiff could
have recovered a fee based on the commission would have
been to enter into an attorney-client relationship with the defendant.
Court-Appointed Counsel

Justice Mosk, writing for the supreme court in Smith v.
Superior Court,9 declared that a California lawyer is a general
practitioner, not subject to any subjective limitation by a
trial court and that a criminal defendant has as much right
to keep a court-appointed counsel as he has to keep a retained
counsel.
This case arrived in the supreme court only after traveling
twice through the trial court and the court of appeal. On
the first appeal, an attorney was appointed to defend Smith.
The conviction was reversed and a new trial granted. lO
During the second trial, friction developed between the appointed counsel and the trial judge. At first, the judge admonished counsel and later in the proceedings asked the lawyer if he had ever handled a case involving the death penalty.
To this, counsel replied, "No." The judge then remarked that
a question had come to his mind concerning counsel's competence to handle such a serious charge. Eventually the
judge decided that counsel was incapable of representing the
defendant and dismissed him from the case.
New counsel was appointed without consulting defendantin fact, over his objections. Throughout the trial defendant
vented his objections to the court, repeatedly asked to be
represented by the original appointee and refused to cooperate
with the newly appointed counsel. Defendant was again convicted. He appealed on the ground he was denied his constitutional right to counsel of his choice.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 284,11 the statu-
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9. 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1,
440 P.2d 65 (1968).
10. People v. Powell, 67 Cal.2d 32,
59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137
(1967).
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tory authority for removing counsel, requires an application
to the court by either defendant or counsel. Since neither
had applied in Smith, did the court have the inherent power
to remove counsel? Justice Mosk said that this power admittedly exists if counsel is physically incapacitated. More
difficult, as Justice Mosk pointed out, is the situation here.
To an extent the answer was supplied by the question "whether
the foregoing power extends to the removal of counsel on
the ground of the trial judge's subjective opinion that counsel
is 'incompetent' because of ignorance of the law to try the
particular case before him.,,12 Exercising this nonstatutory
authority, the trial judge cannot impose his subjective opinion
to the point of compromising the independence of the bar or
infringing the constitutional rights of a defendant to be represented by counsel.
In addressing itself to the first aspect of the case-the
California attorney as a general practitioner-the court lucidly points out that admission to the bar establishes the fact
that the state deems the attorney competent to undertake the
practice of law before all our courts in all types of actions.
While trial judges may use the contempt power to guide
counsel where necessary, only the supreme court has jurisdiction to take direct action if that original appraisal of the
attorney be wrong.
The opinion states further that the removal of counsel on
the ground of incompetency is more of a threat to the independence of the bar than is an arbitrary misuse of the contempt power. As original counsel said in writing for
defendant, "if the advocate must labor under the threat that,
at any moment, if his argument or advocacy should incur
the displeasure or lack of immediate comprehension by the
trial judge, he may be summarily relieved as counsel on a
subjective charge of incompetency by the very trial judge
consent of both client and attorney,
filed with the clerk, or entered upon the
minutes; 2. Upon the order of the court,
upon the application of either client or
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other.
12. 68
at 9, 440

after notice from one to the
. . ."
Cal.2d at 559, 68 Cal. Rptr.
P.2d at 73.
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he is attempting to convince, his advocacy must of necessity be
most guarded and lose much of its force and effect.»l3
The other aspect of this case, involving the attorney-client
relationship where counsel has been appointed, seems to turn
on the constitutionality of whether the court's invasion is
subjective. Here the supreme court acknowledged that an
indigent defendant must generally be satisfied with the counsel
appointed for him but pointed out that here defendant was
indeed satisfied with the original appointment of counsel and
was merely attempting to enforce it.
It was argued that since defendant did not pay for the appointed counsel, he should not be able to object to a change.
In finding this argument unpalatable the court noted that the
attorney-client relationship entails a high degree of trust culminated by a series of consultations and planning-it is certainly not a passing relationship and its existence is independent of the source of compensation.
Ethical Standards

Of general interest to the profession, the ABA Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards has published a
Preliminary Draft of the proposed new Code of Professional
Responsibility.14 The final draft is to be submitted for action
to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at
its meeting in August, 1969. The report shows that the
present code, in the main, was adopted in 1903, that repeated
studies were made by special committees in 1928,1933,1937,
and 1954, and that although these committees made recommendations for overall revision, no action was taken on their
recommendations. The present committee recommends revision in "important areas involving the conduct of lawyers
that are either only partially covered in or totally omitted
from the canons," and where "changed and changing conditions in our legal system and urbanized society require new
statements of professional principles." The committee notes
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13. See 68 Cal.2d at 561, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 10, 440 P.2d at 74.
14. Copies may be obtained by writ252
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the impact of the United States Supreme Court decisions on
group legal services/ 5 on admission to the Bar, and on discipline of attorneys.16
15. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415,9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.C!. 328 (1963),
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 89, 84
S.Ct. 1113, 11 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1964),
and United Mine Workers v. Ill. State
Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.
2d 426, 88 S.C!. 353 (1967).

16. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 77 S.C!.
752, 64 A.L.R.2d 288 (1957); Spevak
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 17 L.Ed.2d 574,
87 S.C!. 625 (1967).
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